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ne of the most widely held views among economists
is  that  comparative  advantage-based  free  trade  is
welfare  enhancing.1  Yet,  as  evidenced  by  recent
protests  directed  at  global  institutions  such  as  the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and
the World Trade Organization, controversy continues to
surround many aspects of globalization. On one hand, the
controversy involves studying issues belonging to positive
analysis, such as the economic impact of increasing trade
and capital flows and the effect of immigration on destina-
tion economies. On the other hand, it also involves issues
belonging to normative analysis, such as whether these
impacts are consistent with the “good” life, as defined by
Judeo-Christian ethics.
Recent public opinion surveys show that U.S. residents
are evenly split over international trade policy, and that this
phenomenon is apparent in other nations as well (Bergsten,
2001). This gap between public policy demands and poten-
tial economic welfare gains creates an interesting policy
problem as special interest groups and non-governmental
organizations become more globally organized, thereby
increasing their capabilities of influencing economic policy
in several countries simultaneously (OECD 1996). Conse-
quently, the disconnect between public perceptions and the
policy recommendations of economists raises the possibil-
ity of a “democratic deficit” (Johal and Ulph 2002) in that
policies are increasingly shaped by the lobbying efforts of
special interest groups rather than in the welfare interests of
the general public. In an effort to better understand the
determinants of various group demands for global eco-
nomic policies, it is a valuable exercise to study the deter-
minants of individual level policy preferences. In fact,
Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) point out that though there
are a number of studies in the economics literature on the
effects of increased globalization on host economies, little
research has focused on the determinants of individual
preferences regarding policies that shape the pace and
progress of globalization. They argue that only after indi-
vidual preferences are understood can reasonable
policymaking efforts be made.
Given the importance of examining globalization and
attitudes towards it, it is surprising to see the relative lack of
attention paid to the influence of religious beliefs on indi-
vidual level global-policy preferences. Iannacone (1998)
argues that though the study of religion has found legiti-
macy in many of the social sciences, it qualifies as new
territory within the field of economics. This may be ex-
plained, at least partially, by the lack of rigor often associ-
ated with measuring political and social factors, such as
religion. As Barro and McCleary (2002) discuss in their
research on economic growth, the economics discipline
increasingly needs to reach beyond narrow measures of
economic variables to include various political and social
factors. Because religion is typically considered to be an
important influence on ethical judgements, it ought to be
considered when studying determinants of individuals’
preferences. Though measuring and rigorously examining
religion may not lend itself easily to standard economic
analysis, its potential impact is still substantial and there-
fore should not be overlooked.
Despite   the   difficulties   of   measuring   religion,   the
economics   discipline   has   not   completely   ignored   the
importance of religion in shaping economic attitudes and
affecting economic outcomes, and recently there has been
a renewed attention to this relationship. Welch and Mueller
(2001), in their taxonomy of the relationship of religion to
economics, recall Alfred Marshall’s statement in his Prin-
ciples of Economics that “. . . the great forming agencies of
the world’s history have been the religious and the eco-
nomic.” Though economic studies in this area are very
diffuse (for summaries of the literature see Smith and
Sawkins 1998 and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2002),
what is yet to be considered in the literature is the relation-
ship between religious affiliation and international-policy
preferences.2 And yet, a recent study on American views of
globalization (PIPA 2000) shows that these views are
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affected by moral beliefs and varying degrees of confidence
in a market-based system.
Religious denominations embrace certain values and
beliefs in their social teaching that will impact the economic
life of their members, and different denominations may
offer different approaches to living these values. Thus, it
may be argued that an individual’s religious affiliation is
one factor that shapes views toward alternative policies,
which in turn may shape globalization. Different denomina-
tions have different approaches to the issue of globalization
and so individuals’ policy preferences will vary in accor-
dance with their religious affiliation. Given the dynamic
nature of globalization and the sometimes vague discussion
of the “good” life by religious leaders, inter-denominational
differences may have grown even greater, and there may
even be significant differences in opinions regarding global
issues within a given major denomination. As Iannaccone
(1998) argues, in nearly all denominations there exist a
number of economic statements from leading thinkers that
can justify a number of economic positions. Consequently,
it is important for economists to study not only the relation-
ship between religion and preferences towards globaliza-
tion, but also how various religious denominations relate
the outcomes of increased globalization to a virtuous life.
For example, the 2000 General Conference amendments to
the social principles of the United Methodist Church in-
cluded the statement:
Increasingly economies of nations are related through
the international economy. There is the rise of glo-
balization through multinational corporations.
Countervailing powers need to be developed to
counteract exploitation by these corporations.
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (2002)
statement on international trade maintains that:3
Trade liberalization is designed to open markets and
increase general economic welfare by promoting
efficiency of production and hence increasing the
availability and reducing the cost of goods and
services. However, trade liberalization, while it may
produce job gains in some areas, can produce job
losses and family and community dislocation in
other areas and can also lead to environmental
degradation. There is also a growing concern that
trade rules may unduly benefit investors in some
countries   to   the   detriment   of   workers   and   the
economies of poorer countries creating a widening
gap between rich and poor. Coupled with growing
international financial instability, trade has moved
from being considered a technical matter to a politi-
cal one.
As indicated above and discussed in more detail in the
next section, there exist a number of studies on individuals’
trade and immigration-policy preferences. These studies
include variables that control for an individual’s region of
residence and their race (African-American) and ethnicity
(Hispanic). Yet as Smith (1987) points out, these variables
may   be   used   as   (arguably   less   than   desirable)   proxy
measures for major religious affiliations and sub-denomi-
national affiliations. For example, a control variable for
African-American may actually reflect the importance of
being Baptist while Hispanic may reflect the importance of
being Catholic, as opposed to being African-American or
Hispanic. Likewise, controls for regions may actually re-
flect the importance of being affiliated with the American
Baptist Convention or the Southern Baptist Convention as
opposed to residing in the north or south respectively.4 Of
course geographical boundaries have weakened over time.
Our objective is to test directly for religious affiliation,
religiosity, regional, racial, and ethnic effects.
Specifically, we examine the attitudes of individuals in
the United States regarding two economic issues: First,
whether the United States should limit imports to protect its
economy; and second, whether the number of legal immi-
grants into the United States should be changed. We find
varying degrees of agreement regarding limiting or expand-
ing trade and immigration among religious affiliations. We
also suggest that these differences are even more important
when judged jointly with the individual’s geographic loca-
tion and ethnic or racial background.
Our contribution, therefore, is twofold. First we argue
that organized religion is an important issue to consider
when studying factors that shape individual policy prefer-
ences on international economic issues and show how its
effect may have been indirectly captured in earlier studies
via other demographic factors. Second, we allow for and
investigate inter-denominational differences. We suggest
that the influence of religion is linked to other factors such
as the individual’s geographical location or ethnic/racial
background. These tangential factors may help to explain
inter- (and intra-) denominational differences in opinions
towards issues of globalization. We have no doubt that all
denominations are concerned with issues such as global
hunger,   poverty,   and   the  distribution  of  income.  It  is
apparent, however, that different denominations will have
varying preferences that lead to different approaches to
addressing these issues. In other words, different denomi-
nations will understand the broad question of whether to
give a man a fish or teach him to fish differently. As a result
of their different perspectives and teachings, members of
different denominations will offer varying responses to this
question. We seek to test whether these denominational
differences are seen in issues of globalization after we
account for the typical factors that are standard in the
literature on preferences towards globalization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section I discusses the standard political economy of global
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trade and immigration policy preferences, and further mo-
tivates the need to incorporate religion into the analysis.
Section II provides the results of a survey on national
identity that relate to our study and describes the connec-
tions among demographic and cultural characteristics and
an individual’s religious affiliation. Section III empirically
tests the significance of religious affiliation on trade and
immigration policy preferences while controlling for other
demographic, economic, and political factors. Section IV
offers a conclusion.
I. The Political Economy of Trade and Immigration-
Policy Preferences
The most recent examinations of trade and immigration-
policy preferences in the economics literature focus on two
common theories of international trade policy preferences:
the Ricardo-Viner (R-V) model and the Heckscher-Ohlin
(H-O) model. Both theories consider the effect of increased
trade on factor returns and provide a framework to explain
how individuals evaluate the effect of opening trade on their
income. (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a,b survey this litera-
ture.) Thus, the major focus of the study of global-policy
preferences is how an individual’s income is affected by
increased globalization.
The different outcomes of these competing models can
be illustrated as follows: If we assume that the United States
is relatively abundant with high-skilled labor the H-O
model predicts that high-skilled workers in the U.S. would
support free trade while low-skilled workers would not.
According to the R-V model, workers employed in com-
parative advantage sectors would support free trade; those
employed in comparative disadvantage sectors would not.
Single-Nation and Cross-Country Studies of Trade and
Immigration-Policy Preferences
There exist in the published literature a number of
qualitative and quantitative single-nation studies on the
determinants of policy preferences. The most recent and
relevant of these is Scheve and Slaughter (2001a,b) who use
individual-level survey data for the United States to identify
if individual skill level or factor type is a significant deter-
minant of trade-policy preferences. Daniels and von der
Ruhr (2003a,b) directly extend the analysis of Scheve and
Slaughter to ten advanced economies. Both sets of authors
find that factor type, rather than sector of employment, and
asset ownership influence trade policy preferences. Other
demographic characteristics, such as gender, race, and trade
union membership were found to be important determi-
nants, while age was not.
Religion and Economics
Empirical studies of the link between religion and eco-
nomics are also prominent, but less numerous in the eco-
nomics literature, and are largely summarized in Iannaccone
(1998). Lowry (1998), for example, considers religion and
membership in environmental groups. The premise is that
religious affiliation may reflect an individual’s beliefs about
“the good society” (p. 225) and the specific policies the
affiliation espouses. Likewise, the strength of an individual’s
religious affiliation may, in turn, affect the degree of their
policy convictions. He finds that the number of members
per household of Judeo-Christian denominations has a
negative and significant effect on state membership rates to
groups advocating policies in favor of environmental pres-
ervation. Further, the results find evidence suggesting that
religious affiliation will positively affect membership to
sportsmen groups advocating private stewardship of natu-
ral resources. Glaeser and Glendon (1998) test Max Weber’s
view that economic growth of Protestant nations exceeds
that of Catholic nations because Calvinism accepts the
dogma of predestination while Catholicism accepts the
dogma of free will. They argue that predestination may be
a more socially efficient belief system. Though the doctrine
of free will provides incentives to those individuals who
believe in an afterlife, predestination offers incentives to
everyone because of their inherent desire to convince others
that they are members of the group chosen by God. Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales (2002) expand on this by examining
the impact of religion on attitudes toward several issues,
including the market economy. They find that, on average,
religious beliefs are conducive to higher per capita income
and growth after controlling for individual characteristics
such as health status, age, gender, education, income, and
perceived social status, as well as country fixed effects. In
a similar manner, Mehanna (2002) finds that countries
whose dominant faith is Protestant tend to be more open, in
terms of trade, than Catholic or Muslim nations.
In additional to an individual’s religious affiliation, it
may be argued that the strength of that affiliation (known as
religiosity) plays a separate role in affecting their prefer-
ences.5 In other words, a devout member of a denomination
may have different views than a less active member of a
religious group. Dahl and Ransom (1999) consider the
importance of the strength of religious affiliation–or religi-
osity–in the presence of economic self-interest by survey-
ing members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints on tithing beliefs. Their premise is that devout
members, defined by church attendance, are less likely to
allow financial self-interest to affect their definition of
income for tithing purposes. Their study allows individuals
to treat gifts, inheritances, stock market gains, unemploy-
ment insurance, tax-deferred pension plans, and self-em-
ployment income differently as they subjectively define
their income for tithing purposes. While they find a pattern
that more frequent churchgoers appear less self-serving
than infrequent churchgoers, their likelihood ratio statistics
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are insignificant. Smith and Sawkins (1998) attempt to
explain the difference in religious participation across coun-
tries controlling for a Catholic monopoly in some nations
and the retention rate of adult participation. They appeal in
part to Iannaccone’s (1998) discussion of religious human
capital in which an individual’s appreciation of a religion is
affected by their own religious knowledge, familiarity with
a religion’s doctrines and rituals, and community with other
members of the religion. Greater religious human capital
and markets where multiple religions are competing for
followers tend to increase membership retention. Gwin and
North (2002) are more specific in their study of cross-
country differences in religiosity. They find that the estab-
lishment of a state sanctioned religion reduces religiosity
while constitutional protection of religious participation
increase religiosity.
As discussed earlier, little attention has been paid to how
religion affects preferences towards international policy
issues. An exception is Barro and McCleary (2002) who
note that religion may have a significant influence in inter-
national trade and finance through such channels as how the
religion encourages or discourages interactions with strang-
ers, but do not pursue the issue.
It seems, therefore, that there is an area in the literature
that requires further examination to consider how religion
is related to preferences towards globalization. The next
section illustrates how a respondent’s professed religious
affiliation relates to their international trade and immigra-
tion-policy preferences. We also comment on how the
influence of religion may be masked by other demographic
factors that are often considered. In particular, we consider
some interesting interactions between religious affiliation,
race and ethnicity, and region.
II. Survey Data
The data employed in this study are the results of a
survey conducted and compiled by Zentralarchiv für
Empirische Sozialforschung. The survey, which embodies
the most current international survey data available on a
broad range of global issues, is part of the International
Social Survey Program (ISSP) and is titled ISSP: National
Identity 1996.6 This survey focuses on respondents’ atti-
tudes toward issues of national identity and international
relations, and includes many demographic variables on the
respondents.
Description of the Survey Questions
The first survey item considered here asks, “How much
do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The
United states should limit the import of foreign products in
order to protect its national economy?” The second item
asks, “Do you think the number of immigrants to the United
States nowadays should be increased or decreased?” Re-
sponses to these questions serve as the variables of interest
and are related to religious affiliation. It is important to note
that using policy-oriented questions assumes that the re-
spondent has some understanding of the effects of global-
policy changes on their individual welfare.
Religious Affiliation
In the political economy literature, a number of demo-
graphic and economic variables are typically used to ex-
plain international policy-preferences, including the
respondent’s skill level (alternatively measured by income
or education), gender, age, political ideology, trade union
membership, and citizenship. The lack of a systematic
inclusion of religious affiliation is understandable, as reli-
gion is difficult to measure, and is not always easily linked
to a priori hypotheses regarding its relationship to specific
economic outcomes. Moreover, its interaction with other
influences on a person’s preferences is difficult to disen-
tangle. Barro and McCleary (2002) note interactions be-
tween a person’s participation in a religion, where the
person lives, and the person’s occupation. Thus, religion,
region, and occupation may have observationally equiva-
lent impacts on a person’s views; and to separate them may
be challenging. We can also easily add another complicat-
ing factor by including ethnic and racial background into the
mix; noting that people of similar heritage may concentrate
in certain areas, and/or share a certain religion. Regardless
of how these factors interact, the core influence of religion
on policy preferences is still important to understand so as
to determine whether it is region, race, ethnicity, or religion,
or some combination thereof that is important.
To begin to explore these issues, we relate the responses
to the policy questions described above to religious affilia-
tion. The survey instrument asked individuals if they be-
longed to a religious group. There were approximately 30
denominations with which the individual could identify
including Catholic, Jewish, Moslem, various Protestant
denominations, Shinto, Hindu, Buddhist, and Sikh. Indi-
viduals were also allowed to select no affiliation or to refuse
to answer. In our sample, individuals identified only with
Catholic, Jewish, Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Episcopa-
lian, other Protestant, other Christian, none, and two refused
to answer (and are treated as missing observations). The
distribution of the sample among these groups is  illustrated
in Figure 1.
By allowing for various Protestant denominations, as
opposed to aggregating them, this study allows for differ-
ences in attitudes among these denominations. As discussed
and summarized by Pyle (1993), a common hypothesis is
that individuals affiliated   with   fundamentalist   denomi-
nations   tend   to   hold conservative  economic  and  political
attitudes.  Moreover, Coreno (2002) argues that in order to
defend radical traditionalism against the penetration of
von der Ruhr and Daniels
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secular values, fundamen-
talists often form small, in-
terdependent–yet indepen-
dent–enclave communities.
By forming enclave com-
munities they are able to
separate themselves, as
much as possible, from the
encroachment of secular
changes. We suspect that this
cultural aspect shapes their
conservative views forming
a brand of isolationist con-
servatism. We expect a
priori, therefore, that funda-
mentalist Protestants are
more likely to oppose free
trade and greater levels of
immigration. We suspect
that differences among Prot-
estant denominations may be
discriminated along the continuum of fundamentalist groups
(Baptists for example) to moderate (Lutheran for example)
to liberal (Episcopalian for example). To classify Protestant
religions in this manner, we rely on categorization scheme
of Smith (1987, 1990). Likewise, we expect that individuals
who identify with denominations classified as liberal will
be less likely to oppose international trade and immigration.
It is important to point out that we examine inter-
denominational differences but not intra-denominational
differences. For example, we test Baptist as a single de-
nomination even though one may argue that the views of,
say, the American Baptist Convention differ from those of
the Southern Baptist Convention.
Religion, Race, Ethnicity, and Region
Participation in a religious organization centers on con-
gregating at a particular place, or one’s place of worship
(one’s local church, parish, or synagogue). Hence, there is
likely to be a strong connection between region and reli-
gious affiliation as some regions have a dominant religion
(as measured by the number of affiliates). This is easily seen
on a national basis, for example, with Catholicism dominant
in the Southern region of Europe and Protestantism domi-
nant in the north. This is important to acknowledge because
in  the  literature,  regional  effects  are  often  argued  to  be
a relevant influence to consider in an analysis of policy
preferences. If, in fact, a regional influence is captured in the
data, it may actually reflect in part the influence of religion.
This would support our claim that religion ought to be
incorporated into economic analysis.
       It can be argued that a dominant religious affiliation
does not exist in the United States because of its unique
religious diversity. Smith
(1987, p. 1) reports that early
in the history of the United
States, the French aristocrat
Talleyrand derisively ob-
served that “the United States
has thirty-two religions but
only one sauce.” Nonethe-
less, a dominant religion may
exist at a regional level.
Typically a religion is
defined as “dominant” if it
has a higher number of affili-
ates, or a relative majority
(Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales (2002) for example).
Table 1 shows the distribu-
tion of religious affiliations
across the nine U.S. Census
divisions.7 Based on a rela-
tive majority, Catholic domi-
nates the New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Cen-
tral, Mountain and Pacific divisions, while Baptist domi-
nates the West North Central, South Atlantic, East South
Central, and West South Central divisions. We expect,
therefore, that a regional control variable may unintention-
ally pick up the effect that a dominant religion has within a
region. For example, controlling for the South Region of the
United States divisions will certainly reflect the dominance
of Baptist conventions and associations in this area (among
other things).
In addition to religious affiliation being connected to
region, there is a connection between religion and race and
ethnicity. Our sample reflects the dominance of Baptist
associations and conventions among African-Americans
with more than half (55 percent) professing an affiliation
with the faith. This aspect is more significant among His-
panics with 64 percent affiliated with Catholicism.
Of course there is transitivity that exists in the above
discussion. If affiliation is correlated to race and ethnicity,
and affiliation is correlated to region, then it could well be
that region and race and ethnicity are correlated. Indeed our
sample has a high concentration of Hispanics in the Pacific
region, with 45 percent of the sample in this region, and
approximately one-quarter in the West South Central re-
gion. If, for example, there is a difference between the
attitudes of Hispanic Catholics and Non-Hispanic Catho-
lics toward trade and immigration, we could expect a
difference between the attitudes of Catholics in, say, the
New England And Middle Atlantic regions, and those in the
Pacific region. In a similar manner, approximately one-
quarter of the African-Americans in our sample reside in the
South Atlantic Region. The South Atlantic, East South
Figure 1. Religious Affiliation of Respondents
Catholic
23%
Jewish
2%
Baptist
22%
Methodist
9%
Lutheran
7%
Episcopal
2%
Other Protestant
15%
Other Christian
5%
None
15%
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Central, and West South Central regions account for nearly
one-half of African-Americans, with an additional 25 per-
cent in the Middle Atlantic Region.
Given the strong association among religion, race,
ethnicity, and region, we must once again exercise caution
in interpreting the impact each individual characteristic will
have on opinions regarding economic issues. Tables 2A-C
and 3A-C provide the distribution of responses to the two
policy questions in light of racial, ethnic, religious, and
regional characteristics. For the entire sample, 69 percent
responded “strongly agree” or “agree,” 14 percent re-
sponded “neither agree nor disagree,” and 17 percent re-
sponded “strongly disagree” or “disagree” to the question
on restricting imports.
Tables 2A-C show that African-Americans agree to a
much greater extent and Hispanics disagree to a much
greater extent than the overall sample and the sub-group of
all others. For African-Americans, this aspect is most pro-
nounced among Catholics, Baptists, Methodists, and in the
South Atlantic, East South Central and West South Central
divisions. For Hispanics it is difficult to discern any particu-
lar pattern due to the small number of observations spread
out over several regions and religions. For the two divisions
where we do have a sufficient number of observations, West
South Central and Pacific, there is an apparent difference in
views, with over 72 percent of Hispanics in the West South
Central agreeing that imports should be restricted as com-
pared to only 47 percent in the Pacific. For all others in our
sample, over 75 percent of Baptists and Methodists, and
individuals in the East South Central and West South
Central divisions agree that imports should be restricted
while less than 60 percent of Jews and Episcopalians and
individuals in the West North Central and Mountain divi-
sions agree.
Tables 3A-C provide the responses to the question “Do
you think the number of immigrants to the United States
nowadays should be . . . ?” There are too few observations
on Hispanics to draw any discernable pattern other than
evidence of strong support in favor of increasing immigra-
tion in the West South Central division. Among African-
Americans in the West North Central division there is also
evidence of above average support for increasing immigra-
tion. For all others there is evidence of above average
support for increasing immigration among Jews. There also
appears to appears to be an intersection of a regional effect
and a denomination effect for Baptists in the East South
central division.
III. Empirical Results
To test for the effect of religious affiliation, we control
for   other   characteristics   by   including   the   following
variables.  Age  and  education  are  continuous  variables
measured in years. Following the economics literature,
education is included as a measure of skill. Scheve and
Slaughter (2001b) show that, when controlling for other
demographic characteristics, education, income, and occu-
pational classification are proxy measures of skill and,
therefore, should not be included together in the same
regression models. Following Daniels and von der Ruhr
(2003a) we use education as a measure of skill.
Political affiliation ranges from unity, for far left, to five
for far right and is treated as a continuous variable in the
regression. Non-citizen, Female, Union, Hispanic, and Af-
rican-American are dummy variables that take the value of
Table 1. Geographical Distribution of Religious Affiliation
Percentage within each region affiliated with the listed religion
Roman
Catholic 45.5 37.9 27.1 20.4 11.6 3.3 19.5 29.9 19.8
Jewish 3.9 4.9 2.2 1.0 2.8              nil 0.8 1.0 2.1
Baptist 10.4 9.4 15.3 23.3 35.6 52.7 35.0 10.3 11.5
Methodist 2.6 6.9 9.2 7.8 11.6 13.2 9.8 7.2 7.3
Lutheran 1.3 6.4 13.5 17.5 4.4 2.4 7.2 4.7
Episcopal 3.9 2.0 1.3 1.0 2.8 2.2 2.4 2.1 3.6
Other
Protestant 11.7 13.8 14.4 7.8 17.2 18.7 17.9 10.3 14.6
Other
Christian 1.3 4.9 2.2 6.8 1.6              nil 5.7 10.3 12.0
None 19.5 13.8 14.8 14.5 12.4 9.9 6.6 21.7 24.4
     New     Middle   East North  West North        South     West South   East South   Mountain    Pacific
   England    Atlantic     Central     Central      Atlantic       Central        Central
The Relationship Between . . .
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Table 2-A. Responses of African-Americans to “U.S. should limit the import of foreign products.”
Census     Other    Other        No Division
Division Catholic Jewish  Baptist Methodist Lutheran Episcopalian  Protestant  Christian  Affiliation    Total
New
England
Middle 75.0 - 62.5 66.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 65.0
Atlantic 25.0 - 37.5 33.3 - - - 30.0
- 100.0 - - - - - 5.0
East North 100.0 60.0 100.0 100.0 66.6 100.0 78.6
Central - 40.0 - - 33.3 - 21.4
- - - - - - -
West North 100.0 - 83.3
Central - 100.0 16.7
- - -
South 100.0 76.9 100.0 100.0 85.7
Atlantic - 15.4 - - 9.5
- 7.7 - - 4.8
East South 100.0 100.0 100.0
Central - - -
- - -
West South 100.0 100.0 - 88.9
Central - - 100.0 11.1
- - - -
Mountain
Pacific - - 75.0 100.0 66.7
100.0 - 25.0 - 33.3
- 100.0 - - -
Denomina- 80.0 - 81.3 87.5 100.0 100.0 77.8 100.0 75.0 79.5
tion Total 20.0 - 16.7 12.5 - - 22.2 - 25.0 18.1
- 100.0 2.1 - - - - - - 2.4
Table entries are percentages responding “Strongly Agree” or “Agree,” “Neither Agree Nor Disagree,” and “Strongly Disagree” or “Disagree” respectively. The lower right cell shows the total
percentage of African-Americans responding to each category.
Table 2-B. Responses of Hispanics to “U.S. should limit the import of foreign products.”
Census     Other     Other       No  Division
Division Catholic Jewish Baptist Methodist Lutheran Episcopalian  Protestant   Christian  Affiliation    Total
New
England
Middle 50.0 - - 37.5
Atlantic 50.0 100.0 100.0 62.5
- - - -
East North 100.0 100.0
Central - -
- -
West North
Central
South
Atlantic
East South
Central
West South 75.0 100.0 50.0 72.7
Central 25.0 - - 8.2
- - 50.0 9.1
Mountain 50.0 100.0 100.0 75.0
- - - -
50.0 - - 25.0
Pacific 40.0 - 100.0 66.6 47.1
30.0 - - - 17.6
30.0 100.0 - 33.3 35.3
Denomina- 53.8 - 100.0 50.0 100.0 57.1 56.1
tion Total 30.8 100.0 - - - 14.3 24.4
15.4 - - 50.0 - 28.6 19.5
Table entries are percentages responding “Strongly Agree” or “Agree,” “Neither Agree Nor Disagree,” and “Strongly Disagree” or “Disagree” respectively. The lower right cell shows the total
percentage of Hispanics responding to each category.
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Table 2-C. Responses of All Others to “U.S. should limit the import of foreign products.”
Census    Other    Other       No Division
Division Catholic Jewish Baptist Methodist Lutheran Episcopalian Protestant Christian Affiliation   Total
New 66.7 100.0 83.3 50.0 - 100.0 16.7 - 63.6 61.7
England 23.3 - 16.7 50.0 100.0 - 33.3 100.0 27.3 26.7
10.0 - - - - - 50.0 - 9.1 11.7
Middle 72.0 57.1 75.0 87.5 55.6 33.3 73.7 50.0 62.5 68.3
Atlantic 16.0 28.6 25.0 12.5 22.2 66.7 15.8 - 18.8 18.3
12.0 14.3 - - 22.2 - 10.5 50.0 18.8 13.5
East North 61.1 84.2 84.2 81.5 - 66.7 66.7 62.5 70.2
Central 27.8 15.8 10.5 14.8 - 16.7 33.3 16.7 19.3
11.1 - 5.3 3.7 100.0 16.7 - 20.8 10.5
West North 61.1 - 46.2 80.0 61.5 - 60.0 60.0 44.4 55.7
Central 16.7 - 23.1 20.0 30.8 - - - 11.1 17.1
22.2 100.0 30.8 - 7.7 100.0 40.0 40.0 44.4 27.1
South 76.2 75.0 82.6 73.7 66.7 40.0 76.9 100.0 61.1 74.8
Atlantic 4.8 - 10.9 15.8 33.3 40.0 7.7 - 16.7 12.2
19.0 25.0 6.5 10.5 - 20.0 15.4 - 22.2 12.9
East South 100 76.5 75.0 50.0 90.0 100.0 82.2
Central - 5.9 12.5 50.0 10.0 - 8.9
- 17.6 12.5 - - - 8.9
West South 78.6 - 70.0 60.0 100.0 50.0 100.0 33.3 75.0 75.8
Central 7.1 100.0 15.0 20.0 - - - - 25.0 10.6
14.3 - 15.0 20.0 - 50.0 - 66.7 - 13.6
Mountain 61.1 100.0 85.7 66.7 20.0 100.0 55.6 55.6 53.8 59.4
33.3 - 14.3 16.7 - - 33.3 - 30.8 21.7
5.6 - - 16.7 80.0 - 11.1 44.4 15.4 18.8
Pacific 66.7 50.0 72.7 66.7 62.5 50.0 65.0 64.3 71.9 66.7
14.3 - 27.3 33.3 25.0 - 10.0 21.4 12.5 16.3
19.0 50.0 - - 12.5 50.0 25.0 14.3 15.6 17.1
Denomina- 67.7 58.9 76.2 75.3 66.6 47.8 71.4 58.1 64.4 65.0
tion Total 19.2 17.6 15.0 17.3 20.8 21.7 12.8 11.6 17.4 16.0
13.1 23.5 8.8 7.4 12.5 30.4 15.8 30.2 18.2 13.7
Table entries are percentages responding “Strongly Agree” or “Agree,” “Neither Agree Nor Disagree,” and “Strongly Disagree” or “Disagree” respectively. The lower right cell shows the total
percentage of all others responding to each category.
Table 3-A. Responses of African-Americans to “The number of immigrants to the United States should be . . .”
Census    Other   Other      No Division
Division Catholic Jewish Baptist Methodist Lutheran Episcopalian  Protestant Christian Affiliation   Total
New
England
Middle 33.3 100.0 12.5 - - - - 15.8
Atlantic 66.7 - 50.0 - - - 50 36.8
- - 37.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 50 47.5
East North - 25.0 50.0 - 33.3 - 21.4
Central 33.3 25.0 - - - - 14.3
67.6 50.0 50.0 100.0 67.6 100.0 64.3
West North 50.0 - - 37.5
Central - - 100 12.5
50.0 100.0 - 50.0
South Atlantic - - - - -
- 20.0 100.0 50.0 40.0
100.0 80.0 - 50.0 60.0
East South 20.0 - 16.7
Central 40.0 - 33.3
40.0 100 50.0
West South 20.0 - - 14.3
Central 20.0 - 100.0 28.6
60.0 100.0 - 57.1
Mountain
Pacific - - - -
- - - -
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Denomina- 14.3 100.0 17.1 10.0 - - 14.3 - - 15.1
tionTotal 57.1 - 24.4 20.0 - - 28.6 - 50 27.4
28.6 - 58.5 70.0 100.0 100.0 57.1 100.0 50 57.5
Table entries are percentages responding “Increased a Lot” or “Increased a Little,” “Remain the Same,” and “Reduced a Lot” or “Reduced a Little” respectively. The lower right cell shows the
total percentage of African-Americans responding to each category.
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Tables 3-B. Responses of Hispanics to “The number of immigrants to the United States should be . . .”
Census    Other   Other      No Division
Division Catholic Jewish Baptist Methodist Lutheran Episcopalian Protestant Christian Affiliation    Total
New
England
Middle 20.0 - - - 37.5
Atlantic 40.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 62.5
40.0 - - - -
East North
Central
West North
Central
South
Atlantic
East South
Central
West South 14.3 100.0 72.7
Central 28.6 - 18.2
57.1 - 9.1
Mountain - - 75.0
- - -
100.0 100.0 25.0
Pacific 33.3 - - - 47.1
44.4 50.0 - 66.7 17.6
22.2 50.0 100.0 33.3 35.3
Denomina- 22.7 - - - 28.6 20.0
tion Total 36.4 100.0 50.0 33.3 42.9 40.0
40.9 - 50.0 66.7 28.6 40.0
Table entries are percentages responding “Increased a Lot” or “Increased a Little,” “Remain the Same,” and “Reduced a Lot” or “Reduced a Little” respectively. The lower right cell shows the
total percentage of Hispanics responding to each category.
Table 3-C. Responses of All Others to “The number of immigrants to the United States should be . . .”
Census Other Other No Division
Division Catholic Jewish Baptist Methodist Lutheran Episcopalian Protestant Christian Affiliation Total
New 3.4 33.3 - - - - - - 9.1 4.5
England 31.0 - 33.3 - 100.0 100.0 44.4 - 45.5 31.3
65.5 66.7 66.7 100.0 - - 55.6 100.0 45.5 64.2
Middle 13.7 - - 10.0 - - 19.0 12.5 15.0 11.4
Atlantic 27.5 28.6 - 20.0 15.4 50.0 28.6 25.0 30.0 25.0
58.8 71.4 100.0 70.0 84.6 50.0 52.4 62.5 55.0 63.6
East North 9.1 25.0 8.3 - 3.6 33.3 4.3 - 3.7 6.5
Central 29.1 50.0 25.0 35.3 35.7 - 30.4 66.7 29.6 31.0
61.8 25.0 66.7 64.7 60.7 66.7 65.2 33.3 66.6 62.5
West North 17.6 6.3 - 11.8 - 14.3 - 16.7 11.1
Central 11.8 25.0 16.7 17.6 100.0 - 60.0 50.0 24.7
70.6 68.8 83.3 70.6 - 85.7 40.0 33.3 64.5
South 8.3 28.6 5.96 4.5 - 14.3 6.1 - 13.3 7.2
Atlantic 41.7 57.1 23.5 22.7 44.4 - 18.2 33.3 33.3 26.8
50.0 14.3 70.6 72.7 55.6 85.7 75.8 66.7 53.3 66.0
East South - 3.3 - - 7.7 71.4 3.1
Central - 20.0 - - 7.7 - 13.8
100.0 76.7 100.0 100.0 84.6 28.6 83.1
West South 20.0 100.0 10.0 - - - 11.8 - - 10.8
Central 26.7 - 26.7 11.1 - 50.0 11.8 50.0 33.3 22.9
53.3 - 63.3 88.9 100.0 50.0 76.5 50.0 66.7 66.3
Mountain - 10.0 - 14.3 - 11.1 12.5 6.3 6.0
38.5 20.0 33.3 14.3 100.0 44.4 12.5 25.0 32.1
61.5 70.0 66.7 71.4 - 44.4 75.0 68.8 61.9
Pacific 9.1 - 12.5 - - - 9.1 15.4 5.6 7.4
22.7 - 18.8 27.3 33.3 50.0 27.3 38.5 69.4 26.7
68.2 100.0 68.8 72.7 66.7 50.0 63.6 46.2 25.0 65.9
Denomina- 9.5 20.0 6.7 2.1 4.6 7.4 9.1 9.3 7.6 7.7
tion Total 29.0 32.0 22.6 74.5 28.0 25.9 23.4 34.9 30.4 26.7
61.4 48.0 70.7 23.4 67.1 66.7 67.5 55.8 62.0 65.5
Table entries are percentages responding “Increased a Lot” or “Increased a Little,” “Remain the Same,” and “Reduced a Lot” or “Reduced a Little” respectively. The lower right cell shows the
total percentage of all others responding to each category.
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United States, trade increases the real returns to high-skilled
individuals and lowers real returns to low-skilled individu-
als–this variable indicates a self-interest motivation.
In addition to the results for skill (education), the results
indicate that non-citizens are more likely to disagree with
import limitation policies, while union members are more
likely to agree. Females and African-Americans are less
likely to disagree, while Hispanics are less likely to agree.
Individuals in the Northeast region are more likely to
choose “neither agree nor disagree” than to disagree or
agree with policies that restrict imports.9
Model 2 adds the major denominations and religiosity to
Model 1. One result changes, as the New England control is
no longer significant in the disagree model. This is likely
due to the inclusion of the denomination controls, as New
England is a predominately Catholic region as noted earlier
in Table 1. In addition to the results reported above, Catho-
lics, Baptists, and Methodists are all less likely to disagree
with polices to limit imports. Those who identified with
“other Christian” are more likely to agree or disagree that to
respond as neither agree nor disagree.
Model 3 creates cohort groups within Model 2. Specifi-
cally, Hispanics and Catholics are divided into three groups,
non-Catholic Hispanics, Catholic Hispanics, and non-His-
panic Catholics. The results indicate that it is religion that is
important, as the non-Catholic Hispanic group is insignifi-
cant while Catholic Hispanics and non-Hispanic Catholics
are less likely to disagree with policies that restrict imports.
Likewise, African-Americans and Baptists are divided into
non-Baptist African-Americans, Baptist African-Ameri-
cans, and non-African-American Baptists. Again it is reli-
gion that is important as non-Baptist African-Americans is
insignificant while Baptists African-Americans and non-
African-American Baptists are less likely to disagree with
the policy statement. Religiosity is not significant in either
Model 2 or 3 indicating that it is more important to belong
than believe.
Comparing and contrasting the results among models 1,
2, and 3 lead us to conclude that there is a regional effect, at
least in the Northeast, and a religion effect. We also con-
clude that religion, rather than race or ethnicity is more
important. Without controlling for religion, Hispanic and
African-American variables may actually be reflecting re-
ligious affiliation effects that result from a majority of
Hispanics being Catholic and African-Americans being
Baptists.
Immigration
Table 5 provides the results on the question as to whether
the number of immigrants into the United States should be
increased or reduced. The response “neither increased nor
reduced” is the base category. Model 1 indicates that
the specific demographic group, and the value of zero
otherwise. The nine census divisions are collapsed into the
four larger census regions of Northeast, Midwest, South,
and West. The West region serves as the control group in our
analysis.8 We also use dummy variables for Catholic, Jew-
ish, Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Episcopalian, other Prot-
estant, and other Christian affiliations. Hence, individuals
that do not claim to belong to any religious affiliation
represent the control group. Each religion variable is inter-
preted as the effect that belonging to a particular group, say
Catholic, relative to not belonging to any religious affilia-
tion. We use dummy variables as well to create cohort
groups within the Hispanic, African-American, Catholic,
and Baptist populations.
Coefficient estimates of binary and multinomial choice
models are notoriously difficult to interpret. Basically, in
this application, the coefficients represent the effect that a
particular characteristic (variable) has on the likelihood that
an individual will select the indicated response relative to
the base response, which in this application is neither agree
nor disagree.
We estimate three different multinomial logit models
for both policy questions, generating estimates of the effect
of various individual characteristics on the likelihood that
an individual will either agree with the policy statement or
disagree with the policy statement relative to neither agree-
ing nor disagreeing. For example, in Model 1 of the “restrict
imports” question, the coefficients for education indicate
that the more educated the individual, the less likely the
individual will agree with a policy that restricts imports and
the more likely they will disagree with such policies relative
to neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the policy. To
visualize this effect, picture the question ranging from
“agree” to “neither” to “disagree,” with all the individual
responses being distributed across this range. Increasing the
individual’s level of education shifts this distribution of
responses from the left (agree) toward the right (toward
neither or disagree).
Limiting Imports
Table 4 provides regressions estimates for three differ-
ent regression models of the “limit imports” question.
Model 1 includes political, demographic and economic
characteristics. The results indicate that more educated the
individual, the less likely the individual will agree with a
policy that restricts imports and the more likely they will
disagree with such policies relative to neither agreeing nor
disagreeing with the policy. This result is consistent with
the economics literature, indicating that the individual’s
skill level is an important determinant of trade policy
preferences. Given what standard trade theory concludes–
that, in relatively skilled-labor abundant nations such as the
The Relationship Between . . .
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Table 4. Multinomial logit estimates for: The United States should limit the import of foreign products in order to
protect its national economy.
Model 1   Model 2 Model 3
Variable       Agree  Disagree    Agree  Disagree     Agree               Disagree
Intercept 3.88* -1.53*** 3.97* -1.07 3.82* -1.12
(0.63) (0.80) (0.65) (0.84) (0.64) (0.83)
Age 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education -0.19* 0.11* -0.19* 0.09** -0.20* 0.09**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Political -0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.04 0.04
   (left to right) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12)
Non-Citizen -0.23 1.12** -0.22 1.00** -0.22 1.07*
(0.43) (0.46) (0.43) (0.48) (0.43) (0.47)
Female 0.02 -0.42** -0.02 -0.47*** -0.02 -0.47***
(0.16) (0.21) (0.16) (0.22) (0.16) (0.22)
Union 0.74* -0.13 0.81* -0.04 0.80* -0.06
(0.27) (0.38) (0.27) (0.39) (0.27) (0.39)
Hispanic -0.74*** -0.55 -0.81*** -0.45
(0.42) (0.56) (0.43) (0.57)
   Non-Catholic -0.33 0.37
   Hispanic (0.83) (0.93)
African-American -0.07 -1.74** -0.08 -1.58**
(0.32) (0.77) (0.33) (0.79)
   Non-Baptist -0.22 -1.72
   African-American (0.46) (1.09)
Northeast -0.42*** -0.56*** -0.43*** -0.48 -0.43*** -0.48
(0.24) (0.31) (0.24) (0.32) (0.24) (0.32)
Midwest -0.37 -0.22 -0.36 -0.09 -0.36 -0.10
(0.23) (0.29) (0.24) (0.30) (0.24) (0.30)
South 0.18 -0.30 0.23 -0.11 0.25 -0.09
(0.23) (0.30) (0.24) (0.31) (0.24) (0.31)
Catholic 0.14 -0.65***
(0.26) (0.34)
   Hispanic -0.83 -1.56***
(0.52) (0.78)
   All Others 0.18 -0.57***
(0.27) (0.34)
Jewish 0.81 0.94 0.83 0.96
(0.67) (0.73) (0.68) (0.73)
Baptist 0.00 -0.76***
(0.27) (0.39)
   African-American 0.04 -2.23**
(0.46) (1.11)
   All Others -0.20 -0.78***
(0.29) (0.40)
Methodist 0.18 -0.86** 0.19 -0.85***
(0.33) (0.50) (0.34) (0.50)
Lutheran -0.08 -0.73 -0.07 -0.70
(0.34) (0.47) (0.35) (0.47)
Episcopalian -0.50 -0.48 -0.48 -0.47
(0.51) (0.63) (0.52) (0.63)
Other Protestant 0.32 0.05 0.32 0.05
(0.31) (0.39) (0.32) (0.39)
Other Christian 0.97** 1.06** 0.96** 1.06**
(0.53) (0.57) (0.53) (0.57)
Religiosity 0.21 0.35 0.21 0.37
(0.17) (0.24) (0.17) (0.23)
χ2 (df) 188.16 (22) 220.46 (40) 222.08 (44)
McFadden pseudo-R2 9.0% 10.5% 10.6%
Sample Size 1,254 1,212 1,212
Note: * significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 10 percent; standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5. Multinomial logit estimates for: Do you think the number of immigrants to the United States nowadays
should be . . .
Model 1     Model 2       Model 3
Variable  Increased  Decreased   Increased   Decreased   Increased   Decreased
Intercept -0.94 1.73* -0.90 1.60** -0.86 1.61*
(0.92) (0.54) (0.95) (0.56) (0.96) (0.56)
Age -0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education -0.06 -0.14* -0.07 -0.14* -0.07 -0.14*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Political (left to right) 0.09 0.24* 0.11 0.24* 0.11 0.24*
(0.14) (0.08) (0.14) (0.09) (0.14) (0.09)
Non-Citizen 0.27 -1.33* 0.27 -1.31* 0.24 -1.32*
(0.43) (0.37) (0.44) (0.37) (0.45) (0.38)
Female -0.15 0.12 -0.18 0.12 -0.19 0.12
(0.24) (0.14) (0.24) (0.14) (0.24) (0.14)
Union -0.37 -0.22 -0.33 -0.23 -0.32 -0.22
(0.37) (0.21) (0.37) (0.21) (0.37) (0.21)
Hispanic 0.39 -0.62 0.28 -0.57
(0.55) (0.43) (0.57) (0.43)
  Non-Catholic -0.46 -0.73
  Hispanic (1.12) (0.65)
African-American 0.71*** 0.09 0.69 0.08
(0.42) (0.30) (0.45) (0.31)
  Non-Baptist 0.40 -0.01
  African-American (0.64) (0.43)
Northeast 0.20 -0.20 0.10 -0.17 0.11 -0.16
(0.37) (0.22) (0.38) (0.22) (0.38) (0.22)
Midwest 0.30 -0.19 0.30 -0.15 0.31 -0.14
(0.36) (0.21) (0.37) (0.22) (0.37) (0.22)
South 0.12 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.01
(0.35) (0.20) (0.37) (0.21) (0.37) (0.21)
Catholic 0.13 -0.13
(0.40) (0.24)
  Hispanic 0.64 -0.34
(0.71) (0.57)
  All Others 0.05 0.11
(0.41) (0.24)
Jewish 1.24*** -0.25 1.19*** -0.26
(0.65) (0.53) (0.65) (0.52)
Baptist 0.06 0.22
(0.45) (0.26)
  African-American 0.87 0.37
(0.62) (0.44)
  All Others -0.06 0.19
(0.47) (0.26)
Methodist -0.87 0.26 -0.88 0.26
(0.71) (0.31) (0.71) (0.31)
Lutheran -0.54 0.12 -0.59 0.11
(0.64) (0.32) (0.65) (0.32)
Episcopalian 0.32 0.59 0.29 0.58
(0.90) (0.53) (0.90) (0.53)
Other Protestant 0.27 0.20 0.25 0.20
(0.47) (0.28) (0.47) (0.28)
Other Christian 0.03 0.21 0.04 0.21
(0.65) (0.38) (0.66) (0.38)
Religiosity 0.38 -0.17 0.37 -0.17
(0.26) (0.15) (0.26) (0.15)
χ2 (df) 84.95 (22) 105.37 (40) 106.56 (44)
McFadden pseudo-R2 4.5% 5.6% 5.6%
Sample Size 1,116 1,077 1,077
Notes: * significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 10 percent; standard errors in parentheses.
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African-Americans are more likely to prefer that the num-
ber of immigrants be increased while individuals with
higher levels of skill (education) and non-citizens are less
likely to prefer decreases in the number of immigrants.
Individuals that identify their political ideology to the right
and older individuals are more likely to prefer that the
number of immigrants be reduced.
Models 2 and 3 add religious affiliation and religiosity
to the base model. The results indicate that those individuals
who identify themselves as Jewish are more likely to prefer
that the number of immigrants be increased. The African-
American effect is no longer significant. Otherwise the
results of the base model hold across Model 2. The inclusion
of cohort groups in Model 3 has no impact on any results.
IV. Conclusion
Significant work continues to be done examining the
demographic, economic, and cultural influences that affect
an individual’s global-policy preferences. Somewhat lack-
ing in the literature is a systematic study of how one’s
religious affiliation influences these preferences. This can
easily be understood given the difficulty of incorporating
religion in typical economic analysis. Nevertheless, an
individual’s religious affiliation is an important cultural
element and, therefore, the social teaching of one’s affilia-
tion will be reflected in an individual’s attitudes toward
global economic issues. Hence, religious affiliation, to-
gether with other cultural elements, is an important determi-
nant of individual attitudes toward global economic issues.
The importance placed in previous literature demographic
factors–such as race, ethnicity, and region–in explaining
policy preferences may inadvertently be reflecting the sig-
nificance of religious influences as well.
Future research should focus on the differences among
and within denominations so as to better understand the
relationship between a particular denomination, its social
teaching on globalization, and its effect on its members.
Specifically, does religion-based social teaching differ along
the continuum from fundamentalist to liberal orthodoxy.
An analysis of intra-denominational differences would go
much farther in investigating this question than we are able
to do here.
Endnotes
1 Alston et al’s (1992) survey of American Economic
Association members shows that the degree of consen-
sus regarding tariffs and import quotas is second only to
that on wage and price controls.
2 One exception is O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001), who
examine individual level trade-policy preferences and
include as an explanatory variable whether the indi-
vidual is Catholic or not. This approach, however,
compares Catholics with a benchmark group that in-
cludes all other individuals who are affiliated with other
Christian, and non-Christian faiths, as well as those with
no religious affiliation at all. It is impossible, therefore
to determine if the estimate reflects the importance of
being Catholic, being Christian, or simply being affili-
ated with any faith.
3 Martin and Laczniak (1989), however, point out the
inherent inconsistency between this position and the
Bishops concerns for the development of the third
world, as protecting jobs in the United States may well
be at the expense of developing nations.
4 The Southern Baptist Convention and the Northern
Baptist Convention, later renamed the American Baptist
Convention originated primarily over the slavery issue.
5 Though the study of religion and religiosity is a rela-
tively small part of economic research, it is widely
studied in other disciplines such as sociology. This is
illustrated by the fact that sociology has a journal en-
titled Sociology of Religion dedicated to this area of
research. Two papers from it are, in fact, discussed in the
next section.
6 Independent institutions in each country collected the
data for the ISSP. Neither the original collectors nor the
ZENTRALARCHIV bear any responsibility for the
analyses or interpretation presented here.
7 The states in each division are: New England–Maine,
New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island; Middle Atlantic–New York, Pennsylva-
nia,   New   Jersey;   East   North   Central–Wisconsin,
Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio; West North Central–
North   Dakota,   South   Dakota,   Kansas,   Nebraska,
Minnesota,   Iowa,   Missouri;   South   Atlantic–West
Virginia,   Virginia,   North   Carolina,   South   Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, Delaware, Maryland; East South Cen-
tral–Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi; West
South Central–Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas;
Mountain–Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah,
Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico; and Pacific–Wash-
ington, Oregon, California, Alaska, and Hawaii.
8 The four aggregated census regions include the follow-
ing divisions: Northeast–New England and Middle At-
lantic; Midwest–East North Central and West North
Central; South–South Atlantic, East South Central, and
West South Central; West–Mountain and Pacific.
9 Using the nine divisions as opposed to the four regions
indicates that individuals in the West South Central
region are more likely to agree with the position that
imports should be restricted. This result holds across all
three versions of the models (as do the other results
reported within the text) even when controlling for
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Baptists, the majority denomination in the region. Hence,
there is evidence of a regional effect in addition to a
religion effect.
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